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Depressive Deficits in Memory: Focusing Attention Improves
Subsequent Recall
Paula T. Hertel

Stephanie S. Rude
University of Texas at Austin

Trinity University

Ss diagnosed as depressed, recovered from depression, or without a history of depressi on
perform� an unintentional learning task, followed by tests of free and forced recall. In the
learning task, Ss decided whether a series of nouns sensibly completed corresponding sentence
frames that varied in decision difficulty. For half of the Ss, the focus of attention was uncon
strained by the demands of this task. The others, however, were required to repeat the targeted
noun at the end of the trial as a. means of focusing their attention on the task. Depressed Ss in
the unfocused condition subsequently recalled fewer words than did both control groups, but
this deficit disappeared in the focused condition. These results suggest that depression might not
fundamentally impair the resources required for good performance on such tasks. The results'
relevance to resource-allocation, initiative, and inhibition accounts of depressive deficits in
memory is discussed.

it has received some support from studies conducted with
clinically depressed patients (see Wil
l iams et al., 1988).
In this report, we provide evidence of greater flexibility in
depressed subjects' allocation of resources than what has been
implied by the resource account. Most tasks used in demon
strations of depressive deficits allow variation in the perform
ance of specific procedures. These tasks are not designed to
prevent diversions by guiding all subjects through procedures
that will be ultimately beneficial. For example, when subjects
are asked to study a list of inherently organized words (as in
Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, & Gerdt, 1981),
some subjects might merely notice that the words are orga
nized, whereas others will develop elaborate retrieval schemes
that are based on the organization. When depressed subjects
do only the former, we cannot assume that they are incapable
of doing the latter. Indeed, depressed subjects might be quite
capable of performing procedures that are well specified,
regardless of the attentional demands involved. Their failure
to do so spontaneously in unstructured situations might im
plicate difficulties in planning and initiation (Hertel & Hardin,
1990) or difficulties in inhibiting attention to sources of
distraction (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) and degenerated inten
tions (Kuhl & Helle, 1986), but not necessaril y limitations on
their capacity for effortful thought.
In research with dysphoric and experimentally depressed
college students, Hertel and Hardin (1990) found depressive
deficits in the spontaneous use of strategies during recognition
testing, that is, deficits that were reduced or eliminated when
such strategies were provided. Leight and Ellis (1981) dem
onstrated, through experimental inductions, depressive defi
cits in the detection of strategies for learning, but not in the
use of such strategies when they had been detected in a
previously neutral state. Similarly, providing clinically de
pressed subjects with strategies for problem solving is an
effective way to reduce the usual impairment (Abramson,
Alloy, & Rosoff, 1981; Silberman, Weingartner, & Post,
1983). These investigations of strategic processing suggest that
depressed subjects are capable of effortful thought, but the
relative attentional demands in the inception and use of such
strategies remain unknown.

A depressed mood is often accompanied by perceived and
actual difficulties in remembering past events. This observa

tion has received empirical support within the clinical and
experimental literatures (see reviews by Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). The
most widely held interpretation of depressive deficits in mem
ory is that depression imposes a limitation on the cognitive
resources that are available for performing beneficial memory
procedures. This "resource" account of depressive deficits
originated from a ds
i tinction between automatic and effortful
processes (Hasher & Zacks, 1979) and was further developed
by Ellis and Ashbrook's (1988) emphasis on resource alloca
tion. In both developments, the theoretical footing was sup
plied by Kahneman's (1973) assumption of a fixed capacity
or pool of cognitive resources available for conscious atten
tion.
The resource account assumes either that depression re
duces capacity physiologically or that it occupies a portion of
the available resources through the allocation of attention to
task-irrelevant matters; fewer resources are therefore available
for performing procedures that will benefit later attempts to
remember. This formulation was derived from work with
college students who were either naturally dysphoric or ex
perimentally "depressed" by mood-induction procedures, but
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The research reported here illustrates a more basic ap
proach. In designing this experiment, we hoped to show that
depressed people are capable of performing effortful proce
dures when the task requires them to focus attention. Partic
ipants in the experiment included clinically depressed outpa
tients, outpatients recovered from depression, and a com
munity sample of adults with no history of psychological
disturbance. Our experimental method was similar to the one
used in Experiment 3 by Ellis, Thomas, and Rodriguez ( 1984);
it was chosen because that study is frequently cited in support
of the resource account.
Ellis et al. (1984) induced depressed or neutral moods in
college students before presenting them with an incidental
learning task The task required subjects to make decisions
about the semantic fit of words into sentence frames. These
frames were more or less difficult to complete with the tar
geted words, according to independent ratings. An unexpected
test of free recall of targets followed the learning phase. The
results from this test and others using similar procedures
(Hertel, 1989; Hertel & Rude, 1991; Tyler, Hertel, McCallum,
& Ellis, 1979) showed that subjects in a neutral mood recalled
more words from the difficult sentences than from the easy
sentences. However, Ellis et al.'s depressed subjects recalled
similar numbers of words from easy and difficult sentences
and thereby demonstrated impaired memory for materials
from difficult contexts.
Our method included a similar learning phase, but we
varied the extent to which attention to the targeted words was
required during that phase. In the focused condition, the
target appeared only briefly at the beginning of t he trial and
was followed by the sentence; with the offset of the sentence,
subjects repeated the word aloud and reported their judgment
of fit (yes or no). In the unfocused condition, the target
remained on the screen; subjects were allowed to report their
decision at any point during the trial and were not asked to
report the target. (The unfocused condition was closer to the
method used by Ellis et al., 1984, who presented sentence
frames and noun pairs successively and allowed subjects to
choose the correct alternative by pressing a button at any
point during the presentation of the pair.) Subjects in the
unfocused condition could engage in further processing after
the decision was made or could allow their minds to wander.
We predicted that depressed subjects would be less likely
than nondepressed subjects to maintain their attention to the
task when not explicitly required to do so (i.e., in the unfo
cused condition). The rationale for this prediction rests on
the well-documented tendency for depressed people to show
chronic levels of self-focused attention or otherwise to focus
on task-irrelevant matters (see Ingram, 1990). As Hasher and
Zacks (1988) proposed for elderly samples, irrelevant focus
disrupts task-appropriate processing and enhances competi
tion during retrieval. The consequence would be a depressive
deficit in recall following the unfocused learning task. In
contrast, all subjects in the focused condition were kept on
task by the requirement to repeat the word and the decision
at the end of the trial. We therefore predicted comparable
levels of recall from the non depressed and depressed subjects
in the focused condition, all of whom should be capable of
allocating sufficient resources to comply with task demands.
.

The method used in this research also included a secondary
task technique for assessing the availability of attentional

resources. Subjects pressed a key in response to a brief tone
that occurred during their exposure to the sentence frame.
Longer latencies to respond to the tone are offered as indica
tions that fewer resources are available for tone detection,
typically because they are allocated in greater proportion to
the primary task (see Inhoff & Aeming, 1989; Kerr, 1973;
Tyler et al., 1979).1 Longer response latencies by depressed
subjects might also reflect motor retardation or the allocation
of attention to task-irrelevant matters. In an exploratory
attempt to address these issues, we included two series of
baseline trials in which tones were presented apart from the
primary task. The baseline trials were used to evaluate preex
isting differences in response latencies (as might be incurred
by task-irrelevant thinking or by motor retardatio n on the
part of depressed subjects). These differences were partialed
out in subsequent analyses of secondary-task performance.
The adjusted latencies were then used to examine depression
related differences in the allocation of attention to the learning
task

.

In summary, participants were currently depressed, re
covered from depression, or reporting no history of depres
sion. Regardless of their diagnostic status, they were assigned
to an incidental learning task that varied in the extent to
which it constrained the focus of attention and that was
followed by an unexpected test of recall. We predicted that
depressed subjects would show impaired recall compared with
nondepressed controls, but only under unfocused learning
conditions, when subjects' attention could be diverted to task
irrelevant matters. By requiring more attention to the task,
the focused condition was expected to eliminate differences
associated with a depressed state. Finally, a secondary task
was used to investigate possible differences in the allocation
of attentional resources.
Method

Subjects
Criteria. Our criteria for participation included (a) an upper limit
of 55 years of age; (b) a high-school diploma or its equivalent; (c)
fluency in English; (d) no prior history of shock treatment, organic
1 Conceptual problems arise from secondary task-methods for as
sessing use of fiXed capacity (see Hasher & Zacks, 1988). These
problems, however, are inherent in the assumption of a unified pool
of resources and the concomitant need to assess the resource demands
of a particular task, independent from memory performance. The
secondary-task technique is probably the best one avali able for those
purposes and has produced consistent results across experiments
performed with the methods we use in this report (see Hertel, 1989;
Hertel & Rude, 1991; Tyler et al., 1979).
Somewhat different issues regarding secondary tasks were raised
by Williams et al. (1988). They reviewed evidence suggesting that the
use of a secondary task may reduce the frequency of distracting
thoughts in depression (which would reduce deficits in subsequent
recall). This issue would arise in the context of the present research,
if a deficit were not observed; the use of the secondary task was a
constant factor with respect to the conditions of our primary task.

DEPRESSIVE DEROTS IN MEMORY
impairment, seizures, or thought disorder; and (e) no recent history
of substance abuse. Subjects recruited for the depressed and recovered
groups must have had diagnoses of depression with no evidence of
manic episodes. Subjects recruited for the nonpsychiatri�ntrol
group must have had no prior history of psychological disturbance.
Recruiting methods. Potential participants were contacted
through several sources. The primary source for depressed and re
covered outpatients was the Audie L. Murphy Veterans Administra
tion (VA) Hospital in San Antonio, Texas. Psychiatrists and a psy
chologist on the staff wrote letters to psychiatric outpatients who
conformed to our criteria (which were later verified by checking the
records). Nonpsychiatric controls were obtained through other med
ical clinics. Another major source was a private clinic that routinely
tests applicants for the Texas Rehabilitation Commission. Suitable
clients were contacted by mail by the psychologists on its staff.
All letters offered the opportunity to participate in a research study
at Trinity University. Prospective participants were told that the study
involved the use of a computer to perform routine cognitive tasks.
The letter promised payment of$10 per hour and provided the names
and phone numbers of individuals to contact. When volunteers
phoned, they we.re screened for uncorrected or poor ly corrected
vision.
The third source of participants was the staff of Trinity University,
which was added midway through the study for the purpose of
recruiting nonpsychiatric controls. We circulated fliers that described
the study, payment, method of volunteering, and certain criteria (age,
language, and educational level).
Final sample. A total of 86 individuals volunteered. Ten volun
teers did not show up for their appointments (others did not show up
for initial appointments, but were rescheduled successfuly
l ). For their
data to remain in the sample, depressed subjects were required to
meet Research Diagnostic Criteria (ROC) for major or minor depres
sion (Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978), with no report of monic
episodes. These criteria were applied to responses collected during a
structured clinical interview (see the procedures). On the basis of this
interview, participants with prior diagnoses of depression were clas
sified as recovered from depressio n if they did not meet the ROC and
if they scored less than 14 on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDl;
Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). Taylor and KJein
(1989) recommended that a cutoffscore of 14 on the BDI shou.ld be
used as an index of recovery. The same criteria regarding the interview
and BDI were also used to validate the nondepressed status of
nonpsychiatric controls.
Data were set aside for 12 subjects who did not meet our initial
criteria (4 subjects showed evidence of manic episodes revealed during
our clinical interview, another 3 subjects described current experience
of substance abuse, 2 subjects had received shock treatments, 2
subjects did not meet educational criteria, and I was too old). Data
were set aside for another 4 subjects whose BDI scores fell outside
the preestablished range. Finally, the data from 2 randomly selected
subjects were eliminated from analyses to equalize numbers across
task conditions. The distribution of the 58 remaining subjects, ac
cording to diagnostic group, is described in Table 1, along with the
demographic characteristics of the sample. (Age and the number of
years of education did not reliably vary according to diagnostic status
or the type of learning task.) Of the 58 subjects, 23 were recruited
from the VA, I I from private practice, and 14 from the staff at
Trinity University.
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Table l
Characteristics ofthe Sample
Diagnostic status
Measure
Total

Age

n

Education
Gender
Female
Male
Ethnicity
Anglo
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Hospitalization
None
<I year
>I year

Nonpsychiatric

Recovered

Depressed

16
38.9
13.9

16
41.1
14.9

26
40.7
13.8

9
7

6
10

6
20

10
0
2
4

II
1
2
2

17
0
I
8

16
0
0

II
0
5

15
4
7

Note. Most entries are the numbers of participants in each category;
age and education are noted in mean numbers of years. Hospitaliza
tion refers to the interval between participation and hospitalization
for psychiatric purposes.

subject to view a word followed by a sentence with one word missing
and to decide whether the word fit sensibly into that sentence frame.
Unknown to the subject at the outset, all words fit sensibly into the
corresponding frames. The 40 words were nouns high in frequency,
concreteness, and meaningfulness; their accompanying sentence
frames had been pretested for difficulty of completion (see Hertel,
1989). Each word appeared with easy frames for approximately half
of the subjects in each experimental conditions and with difficult
frames for the others. For example, the word artist was sometimes
followed by The young man's portrait was painted by the __ . Other
subjects saw artist followed by The young mans physique was ad
mired by the -- .
The learning task was implemented on a CompuAdd-286 com
puter. The program began with the presentation of instructions, 15
baseline trials of tone detection, and 4 practice trials that represented
each level of difficulty and tone delay. AU practice and lea.ming trials
began with a l·s display of a word at the top center of the screen. In
the focused condition, the offset of the word occurred simultaneously
with the onset of the sentence frame, which was centered on the
screen and remained exposed for 8 s. In the unfocused condition, the
word remained exposed for the duration of the sentence frame. On
80% of the trials in both conditions, a weak but detectable tone
occurred at delays of I, 2, 4, or 6 s after the onset of the frame. With
the offset of the frame, a question mark appeared and the trial was
terminated by a keypress. A blank screen lasting I s separated trials.
The 40 words were grouped into blocks of I 0. Each block contained
4 five-letter words, 4 six-letter words, I seven-letter word, and 1 eight
letter word. Across subjects, words were maintained in these blocks
as they rotated through the 10 counterbalanced orders obtained by
crossin g sentence difficulty (easy vs. difficult) with tone delay (no
tone or a delay of I, 2, 4, or 6 s after the onset of the sentence). The
order of tone delays was consta.nt for aU subjects.

Procedure and Other Materials
Experimental Materials
Learning task. The learning task conformed to the methods of
Tyler et al. (1979, Experiment 4), but was computer-implemented. It
consisted of 40 sentence-completion trials. Each trial required the

The experimental session began with informed consent, followed
by an initial administration of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check
List (MAACL Today Form, Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). The exper
imenter assigned subjects to conditions for the learning task on the
basis of their previous diagnosis. Assignment to the focused or unfo-

304

PAULA T. HERTEL AND STEPHANIE S. RUDE

cused condition was random, with the constraint of obtaining equal

Table 2

numbers in each type of task within each diagnostic group. As
described above, crossing the two levels of sentence difficulty with
the five levels of tone onset for counterbalancing purposes produced

Mean Number of Words Recalled

10 stimulus-presentation orders to which subjects could be assigned.
The 13 depressed subjects in each learning condition were distributed
across these 10 orders such thai all orders were represented. Because
there were only 8 recovered and 8 control subjects in each learning
condition, all 10 orders could not be used in these groups. But
sentence difficulty was balanced, and the 8 subjects in each group
received unique orders with one exception: In one group only 7 of
the I 0 possible orders were used.
Instructions and examples for the learning

task

were presented

orally and on the computer screen; they were augmented by further
clarification by the experimenter when it was necessary. Subjects were
informed that two dife
f rent tasks would be performed simultaneously:
a primary sentence-<:ompletion task and a secondary task of detecting
an auditory signal. For the primary task, subjects were instructed to
decide whether the word presented at the top of the screen fit sensibly
into the incomplete sentence presented below it. If they were assigned
to the foc.used condition, they were told to repeat the word and the
decision (by saying "yes" or "no") when the question mark appeared
at the end of the trial and then to press a key when they were ready
for the next trial. Subjects in the unfocused condition were asked to
report their decision whenever they chose to do so; the question mark
signaled them to press a key when they were ready for the next trial.
All subjects were informed that most trials would require a "yes"
response, but that some subjects would experience a few negative
instances; therefore, they should consider all decisions carefully.
Instructions for the secondary task told subjects to respond to the

tone by pressing a key with a finger on their nondominant hand.
Fifteen baseline trials for tone detection were presented first a.nd
followed by a review of the requirements for the upcoming primary

task

. This preview emphasized pressing
as quickly as possible in
response to the tone, but without sacrificing attention to the primary
task. The experimente.r answered any questions before resuming the
program. The four practice trials preoeding the learning trials pro
vided additional opportunities for clarification.

After the learning task and a final set of 15 baseline trials, subjects
solved arithmetic problems for 2 min (to prevent recency effects in
free recall). Then the experimenter asked the subjects to write down
all the words they could remember from the words appearing at the
top of the screen during the learning phase; 2 min were allotted for
free recall. Then the experimenter asked them to try harder to recall

and to write at least 20 words, guessing if necessary. So that we could
later differentiate between free and forced recall, a line was drawn
beneath the last word of their initial attempt. (For discussions of the

forcing procedure, see Erdelyi, Finks, & Feigin-Pfau, 1989; Roediger,

Srinivas, & Waddill, 1989.)
Next, subjects filled out another MAACL and the BDl. The
experimenter orally administered Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
RevisC:d (WAIS-R) Vocabulary subscale. Then she conducted an
interview that provided information about age, educational level,
history of psychological treatment, and prescribed and nonprescribed
drugs currently or recently used by the subject. The interview pro
gressed through a series of questions that allowed us to use ROC for
determining specific diagnoses of depression and anxiety. (ROC
guidelines are straightforward; the experimenter's notes on responses
were independently scored by two judges who agreed completely.)

Results and Discussion

Diagnostic status
Learning task

The mean number of total words recalled (free and forced)
are shown in the top half of Table 2. What is readily apparent

Depressed

2.88
4.62
7.50

4.12
5.00

1.46
3.08

9.12

4.54

3.50
4.25
7.75

4.62
4.62
9.25

3.77
5.38
9.15

1.88
3.62
5.50

2.75
3.25
6.00

0.77
1.46
2.23

1.88
3.00
4.88

3.00
2.88
5.88

2.54
4.00
6.54

Total recall
Unfocused
Easy frames
Difficult frames
Both
Focused
Easy frames
Difficult frames
Both

Free recall
Unfocused
Easy frames
Difficult frames
Both
Focused
Easy frames
Difficult frames
Both
Note.

n=

8 for nonpsychiatric, 8 for recovered, and 13 for depressed.

(and also reliable) is that a depressive deficit was obtained in
the unfocused learning condition, but that depressed subjects
recalled as well as controls in the focused condition.
A mixed-design analysis of variance, with between-subjects
factors for diagnostic group (nonpsychiatric, recovered, and
depressed) and learning task (unfocused vs. focused) and
within-subjects factors for sentence frame (easy vs. difficult)
and type of recall (free vs. forced), revealed several reliable
effects. For all effects examined here and throughout this
report, a was set at .OS. Reliable effects that involved diag
nostic status were further examined through orthogonal com
parisons: (a) depressed versus both control groups and (b)
nonpsychiatric versus recovered controls. These planned com
parisons were used for all dependent variables, so that uniform
issues could be addressed.
First, subjects in the unfocused condition recalled fewer
words than did those in the focused condition, F(l, 52)
4.14, MSe
2.30. This disadvantage, however, reliably de
pended on diagnostic status, .f\2, 52)
3.82. Depressed
subjects derived a greater benefit from the focused task than
did the control groups (who did not differ reliably in this
regard), .f\1, 52)= 7.64.
Second, subjects recalled more words that had been evalu
ated in the difficult sentence frames, compared with the easy
ones, F(l, 52)= 8.38, MSe 1.99. The difficulty of the frame,
however, did not reliably interact with diagnostic status or the
type of learning task.
The third set of reliable effects involved the type of recall
test. We obtained a reliable three-w ay interaction of the type
of test, the diagnostic status, and the type of learning task,
F(2, 52)= 5.19, MS.
2.17. This interaction was understood
by examining recall within each type of testing condition.
Essentially, the interaction of diagnostic status with the type
of learning task described above occurred for free recall, but
not for forced recall.
=

=

=

=

=

Recall

Recovered

Non psychiatric

DEPRESSIVE DEFICITS

Free-recall means are presented in the bottom half of Table

2; the difference between the depressed group and the controls
reliably depended on the type of learning task, F(l, 52) =
15.41, MS.= 2.55. Depressed subjects freely recall ed fewer
words than controls following the unfocused task ( Ms
2.23
for depressed and 5.75 for controls), but slightly more words
following the focused task ( Ms= 6.54 for depressed and 5.38

IN MEMORY

Table 3

Means of Median Latencies in Milliseconds
Diagnostic status
Condition

=

for controls). In contrast, no reliable differences were found
among means for forced recall (obtainable by subtracting
means in the bottom half of Table 2 from means in the top
halt).
Among others, Johnson and Magaro (1987) suggested that
depressive deficits in recall result in part from a conservative
bias in depressive styles of responding. Such a bias should be
revealed by the forced-recall procedure in the present experi
ment, in that depressed subjects should recall more words
than nondepressed subjects when forced to guess. Depressed
subjects recalled 2.46 additional words, on average, whereas
the mean for all controls was 2.84. Our results therefore did
not provide evidence that deficits in free recall are confounded
by response bias.
Finally, the effect of the frame's difficulty depended on the
type of test, F(l, 52)= 4.29, MS.= 1.57. Again, no reliable
efec
f ts were found for forced recall, but the effect of difficulty
on free recall reliably obtained, F(l, 52)= 12.40, MS.= 1.80.
Recall and severity of depression. Johnson and Magaro
( 1987) , in a review of memory and clinical depression, con
cluded that severity of depression is an important factor.
When the total number of words recalled by all subjects in
this study were entered into correlation with their BDI scores,
a reliable but low association was found, r(56)= -.36. The
correlation was not reliable in the focused condition, r(27)=
-.23. It was reliable in the unfocused condition, r(27)= -.56,
but not reliably higher than the correlation in the focused
task. However, when free recall was correlated with BDI
scores, a reliable difference obtained (r= -.10 in the focused
condition and -.67 in the unfocused condition; z= 2.171).
Severity of depression, then, appears to be moderately corre
lated with recall under conditions in which attentional con
straints are minimized.

Recall according to the response on the learning
task. During the Learning task, subjects made a mean num

ber of 2.07 negative responses to difficult sentence frames and
subsequently recalled a mean number of 0.60 words judged
not to fit in those frames. These negative responses and
subsequently recalled words were evenly distributed across
conditions and no reliable differences were revealed. As might
be expected, negative responses to easy frames were negligible
in number (M = .17), and so were the numbers of words
recalled from those trials (M= .05).

Latencies in Responding to the Tone
Baseline trials. Means of median latencies from each set
of baseline trials are shown in the top half of Table 3. A
mixed-design analysis of variance with factors for diagnostic
status, type of learning task and time of administration
(before or after the learning task) revealed a reliable main
,
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Nonpsychiatric

Recovered

Depressed

305
481

333
670

466

296
335

294
387

584
443

Baseline trials
Before learning task
Unfocused task
Focused task

820

After learning task

Unfocused task
Focused task

Secondary task (adjusted by baseline medians)
Unfocused task
Easy frames
610
810
876
Difficult frames
785
971
1380
Focused task
Easy frames
755
776
1076
Difficult frames
993
1304
937
Note.

n=

8 for nonpsychiatric, 8 for recovered, and 13 for depressed.

effect of timing, � l , 52)= 15.52, MS.= 26696.10. Subjects
responded more quickly after the learning task.
The analysis also revealed a reliable three-way interaction,
F(2, 52) = 5.68, which was understood by examining median
latencies on each set of baseline trials. On the set of baseline
trials that occurred before the learning task, diagnostic status
reliably interacted with the type of task even though it bad
not yet occurred, F(2, 52)
3.77, MS.
184385.99. More
specifically, longer latencies by depressed subjects occurred
only for those who later received the unfocused task, F(l, 52)
= 7.07. After the learning task, the only reliable effect pointed
to longer latencies by depressed subjects overall, F(l, 52)=
5. 73, MS.= 86238.06. The interaction in the pretask trials is
difficult to interpret. For example, the data collected on
severity of depression (e.g., BDI scores and distributions across
ROC categories described below) do not indicate that the
subjects in the unfocused learning condition were more de
pressed. Regardless, the posttask effect suggested that both
depressed groups were affected by task-irrelevant factors that
operated throughout the learning task and beyond.
Secondary task. Median latencies on the secondary task
were reliably correlated with median baseline latencies, r=
.66, �1, 51)= 38.93, MS.= 533956.60. They were conse
quently adjusted by the baseline medians, averaged across the
two sets. The adjusted means are shown in the bottom half
of Table 3. An analysis of covariance revealed only a margin
ally reliable main efe
f ct of diagnostic status, F(2, 51)= 2. 79,
p < .08. But because differences in the availability of cognitive
resources are central to resource accounts of depressive defi
cits, we examined comparisons among diagnostic groups.
Only the comparison between the depressed subjects and the
controls was reliable, �1, 52) = 5.40; depressed subjects
responded more slowly to the tone, even when baseline dif
ferences were controlled.
The type of learning task did not reliably afec
f t latencies
(with or without the covariate). The only reliable efe
f ct in the
overall analysis occurred with respect to the difficulty of the
sentence frame, F{l, 52)= 10.02, MS.= 148816.95. As is
,

=

�
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typically found, subjects took longer to respond to the tone
on the more difficult trials.2

criteria for probable major depression, and 2 met criteria for
minor depression. Of the 13 subjects in the focused condition,

12 met criteria for definite major depression and 1 met criteria

for probable major depression. Eight of the depressed subjects

Diagnostic Indices

in each learning condition also met criteria for anxiety.

WAIS-R Vocabulary subsea/e. Scores on this test were

MAACL.

sions of the scales for depression and for anxiety were col

tic group and type of learning task. Means are presented in

Table

To produce approximately normal distributions

of scores on the MAACL, the positive and negative dimen

submitted to an analysis of variance, with factors for diagnos

lapsed by subtracting the negative score from the positive
seore. The resulting scores for depression and anxiety were

4. Although there was an apparent trend for subjects in

the focused condition to score higher, there were no reliable

submitted to separate analysis of variance, with factors for

differences. Scores on the WAIS-R were not reliably. corre

diagnostic status and type. of leaming task and repeated meas

lated with recall performance,

r(56) = .03. The correlation
between recall and years of education was not reliable as well,
r(56)= .04.
BDl. Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, and lng{am
(1987) recommended reserving the label depression for Sub
jects who score 16 and above on the BDI and who also meet

ures

on the time of �tdministration (before the learning task

or after recall). Means are shown in Table

4. Lower scores

indicate lower levels of the mood in question.
Neither analysis �owed reliable effects involving the type
of learning task. The analysis of depression scores revealed a
reliable main effect of diagnostic status, F(2, 52) = 17.85,

criteria for depression ascertained through a structured clinical

interview. Two subjects whom we categorized as depressed

MS.= 58.59. Planned comparisons showed that the depressed
group scored higher than the control groups, F( l , 52)= 28.53,

data in the depressed conditions. Recovered subjects all scored
below 14 on the BDl. Mean scores on the BDI are presented
in Table 4; they were submitted to two separate analyses of

subjects, .F(l,

produced BDI scores of 14 or 15, but these subjects tnet ROC
for definite major depression. Consequently, we included their

and that nonpsychiatric controls scored higher than recovered

52) = 7.17. In addition, the interaction of

<lfagnostic group with time of administration was reliable,

F(2,

52)

•

5.22, MS.= 14.54. The depressed subjects main

subjects in both conditions of the learning

tained their initial moods to a greater degree than did control
subjects, F(l , 52)= 6.83. And there was a trend for the moods

(Analyses were separated because we hac.l established cutoff

recovered control

variance: one for scores obtained from recovered and control

task and the other
for scores obtained from the two groups of depreSsed subjects.

scores on the BDl.) These analyses revealed no reliable differ
ences.

RDC. Of the 13 depressed subjects in the unfocused con
dition, lO met criteria for definite major depression, 1 met

Table 4
Means on Diagnostic Measures Collected in Session

M�ure

f

· ·

.Diagnostic status

Nonpsychiatric

Recovered

of nonpsychiatric controls to worsen more than the moods of

·n

Focused task
n

BDI
Unfocused task
n

Focused task
n

MAACL-Depression
Pre

n

Post
n

MAACL-Anxiety
Pre
n

Post
n

22.66, was partitioned into the same two comparisons: �
52)=
23.95, and rwnpsychiatric controls were more anxious than
recovered controls, F( l, 52)= 4.98. Diagnostic status reliably
interacted with the time of administration, F(2, 52)= 6.68,
MS. = 5.46. Depressed subjects tended to maintain their
initially anxious moods more than controls tended to stay

relatively less anxious, F(l,

Depressed

52)= 5.92. The anxiety levels of

nonpsychiatric controls increased more than those of re

10.4
8
11.4
8

10.6
8
10.1
8

9.8
13
11.8
13

covered controls, F(1,

5.6
8
6.5
8

4.6
8
4.5
8

25.1
13
26.2
13

controls,

-6.4
16
-2.2
16

-9.7
16
-9.1
16

1.5
26
0.1
26

-3.7
16
-0.6
16

-4.8
16
-4.9
16

1.2
26
0.5
26

Subscales on the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List
(MAACL) were computed by subtracting the negative score from the
positive score in each affective category. WAIS-R refers to the Wechs
ler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised. BDI refers to the Beck Depres
sion Inventory.
Note.

52)= 3.62, p < .07.

pressed subjects were more anxious than controls, .F(l,

WAI5-R Vocabulary

QpfoCused task

.F(l,

The analysis of anxiety scores revealed similar effects. The
main effect
diagnostic status, F(2, 52) = 14.47, M!:>'c =

Medication.

52)= 7.44.

9

One subject among the

16 nonpsychiatric

controls reported taking an antidepressant, prescribed for
reasons other than depression. In the group of

16 recovered
31% were currently medicated with antidepressants
and 25% with antianxiety drugs. Among the 26 currently
depressed subjects, 35% reported current use of antidep es
sants and 35% antianxiety medications. About half of the
subjects in each diagnostic group reported use of other pre
scribed medications. All subjects reported only slight to mod
erate use

(if any) of alcohol and infrequent use (if any) of

other recreational drugs.

2 We acknowledge an interest in median latencies distributed across
categories of tone delay; depressed subjects might show patterns that
differ from nondepressed subjects. However, the 16 tone-present trials
'til. each condition of difficulty, the four delays, and moderately
Varntble raw latencies make meaningful analysis difficult.

.

·
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Presence Versus Absence ofSymptoms ofAnxiety
Anxiety is a common presenting symptom in clinical inter
i quite
views with depressed clients, and differential diagnosis s
difficult (Greenberg & Beck, 1989). Most of our depressed
subjects met ROC for anxiety as well as for depression. Yet,
there are potentially important differences in the cognitive
correlates ofthese disorders (Williams et al., 1988). We there
fore performed additional analyses on the data from depressed
subjects by using between-subjects factors for anxiety (pres
ence or absence) and the type of learning task There were 5
subjects without anxious symptoms in each condition of the
learning task (and 8 anxious subjects). Age, ethnicity, educa
tional background, and WAIS-R scores were comparable for
anxious and nonanxious subjects, although the latter pro
duced slightly higher scores on the BDI (29.50 vs. 23.25).
Latencies and recall scores did not reliably differ according to
the presence of anxious symptoms, but trends showed that
nonanxious depressed subjects in the unfocused task took
longer to respond to the tones and subsequently recalled
slightly fewer words (the means were 4.00 for nonanxious and
4.88 for anxious subjects). In the focused condition, the means
on recall and latencies showed no apparent trends.
.

General Discussion
When the nature of the learning task allowed greater vari
ation in the focus of attention, depressive deficits occurred in
subsequent recall; when the focus ofattention was constrained
by the nature of the learning task, these deficits were elimi
nated. These were the major findings demonstrated in this
report.

The task used to demonstrate the effects of attentional
control was chosen because it is representative of learning
tasks in which depressive deficits have been observed. It is
very similar to one of the tasks used by Ellis et al. (1984) in
their examination of the relationship between depressive def
icits and attentional resources. Although this report might be
the first documentation ofeffective attentional control during
the learning phase of an experiment on depressive memory,
other investigations provide some basis for suggesting that
depressive deficits can be more generally eliminated through
the experimental control or constraint ofcognitive processing.
By controlling the use of strategies during retrieval, for ex
ample, Hertel and Hardin ( 1990) improved the recognition
performance of depressed students. And in their review of
findings from a variety of experimental paradigms, Hertel
and Hardin suggested that depressive deficits typically occur
when tasks permit variation in specific cognitive procedureS.
Nondepressed subjects are likely to detect or invent appropri
ate procedures spontaneously, but depressed subjects tend to
do only what they are told to do.
In our experiment, opportunity for the spontaneous use of
procedures was provided in the unfocused condition, in which
subjects could choose to rehearse the materials and possibly
provide elaborations and distinctions. In contrast, the focused
condition required rehearsal of the target and delayed report
of the decision, such that more elaborative and distinctive
processing of the target in the context of the sentence frame

was possibly encouraged. We are not interested in claiming
that these specific processes occurred; rather, we suggest that
these or other processes were more likely to be invoked by
the .focused learning task and more likely left to the subjects'
initiative in the unfocused task
Our evidence for a depressive deficit in initiative is consist
ent with the emphasis in the clinical literature on lack of self
efficacy and feelings of failure (see Rehm, 1988), but the
balance of cognitive and motivational factors that might
contribute to the deficit is difficult to determine. The most
general issue that arises in this context involves the distinction
between factors related to competence and those related to
performance.
.

.

Performance-Competence Distinctions
Do depressive deficits in memory tasks result from insuffi
cient abilities, or are depressed people simply unmotivated to
perform at the levels of competence that would otherwise
reflect unimpaired ability? The issue of competence is further
complicated by the question: Ability to do what? Ifthe ability
to focus attention when the task requires it is the issue, as in
the present report, we know that depressed people can focus
well enough to recall at "normal" levels. But f
i the issue is the
ability to muster attention when it is not required, the answer
is unknown.
At first glance, it might seem that a motivational manipu
lation would help. For example, ifthe unfocused learning task
were performed under conditions ofintentional learning, and
if no impairment in subsequent recall resulted, we might
conclude that the depressed subjects were sufficiently moti
vated to exhibit their knowledge that it is important to pay
attention to the words when they must later recall them. Even
if such results obtained, however, we would need to account
for the results from actual experiments on intentional learning
that have shown depressive deficits (see Williams et al., 1988).
In those cases, we do not know whether a lack ofcompetence
in discovering the best procedures was responsible, or whether
the depressed subjects were not sufficiently motivated by the
demands for recall to initiate their use.
The picture is further clouded by an analysis of motiva
tional factors in performance. Riskind (1989) suggested that
one important factor in depressive deficits in memory is lack
of interest, which might be supplied by increasing incentives.
This approach would require an identification of suitable
incentives fordepressed people. Yet all motivational variables
do not reduce to incentives and some seem to be meshed
inextricably with cognitive variables. For example, Rehm
( 1988) beieved
l
that depressed people easily access ideas re
lated to failure and lack of self-efficacy as they perform
cognitive tasks. Finally, certain types of "motivational" ma
nipulations (e.g., intentional-learning instructions} might be
better identified as cognitive variables. As we have implied,
intentional-learning instructions might motivate subjects to
perform well to preserve self-esteem. Alternatively, such in
structions might operate simply as cues for learning proce
dures. If the instructions to learn the words do not cue the
appropriate procedures, the analysis reverts to issues related
to competence.

308

PAULA T. HERTEL AND STEPHANIE S. RUDE

In short, the conceptual distinction between competence
and performance as it relates to the nature of depressive

deficits in memory is a difficult distinction to make on
empirical grounds. This difficulty probably arises in part from
artificial boundaries between cognitive and motivational fac
tors. Nevertheless, on practical grounds it is important to
understand the conditions that do produce competent per
formance by depressed people, so that tasks can be designed
to tap these competencies (see Hertel, in press). This is the
point that we want to emphasize, because our results speak
directly to some aspects ofcompetence. We next address those
aspects in the context of two formulations of depressive
deficits in memory: The resource-allocation account provided
by Ellis and Ashbrook ( 1988) and an adaptation of Hasher
and Zacks's ( 1988) model for cognitive difficulties associated
with aging.

Resource Allocation
Despite the wide appeal of resource accounts of depressive
memory impairments, they have not been fully developed.
One neglected issue concerns the modifiability of resource
limitations. In its strong form, the resource account makes a
claim about the availability of resources by assuming that a
certain proportion of attentional resources is made unavaila
ble when a person is depressed. This form of the account is
compatible with some biochemical approaches (see Wein
gartner et al., 1981 ). The central prediction of Ellis and
Ashbrook's ( 1988) resource-allocation model is that tasks that

involve greater attentional demands will result in greater

disparities in the performance of depressed and nondepressed
subjects. In particular, demands imposed by more difficult
tasks are more likely to exceed the depressed subjects' avail
able resources. Ellis and Ashbrook did not explicitly address
the issue of modifiability, although they did acknowledge the
potential influence on memory performance of "a variety of
task variables, subject variables, mood variables, instructional
variables, and other contextual variables" (1988, pp. 30-31).
As we view our results in relation to the resource account,
we emphasize first that depressed subjects had sufficient re
sources available for attending to the learning task: Recall
following the focused task did not show a depressive deficit.
This improvement cannot be attributed to reduced demands
on resources, the explanatory variable emphasized by Ellis
and Ashbrook (1988), because the task that eliminated the
deficit was no less demanding than the task that produced it.
It should also be noted that depression was stringently defined
in our research and that severity of depression was reliably
correlated with performance under the less-focused-learning
and testing conditions, but not when attention was more
controlled. Thus, the strong version of the resource account
cannot incorporate our results.
Nevertheless, the present findings do not demonstrate that
depressed and nondepressed subjects have comparable
amounts of resources available. Although the depressed sub
jects in the focused condition recalled as well as controls, their
latencies on the secondary task were longer. Perhaps they
thought harder about the task materials than did controls
(without a corresponding benefit for recall), or perhaps they

were occupied with other matters, but we cannot rule out a
basic limitation on the availability of resourceS as an expla
nation of the longer latencies. Regardless, recall performance
in the focused condition makes a case for competence in
depression. From the point of view of resource theory, this
means that sufficient resources were available to perform a
task that Ellis et al. ( 1984) used to demonstrate that they were
not available.
A weaker form of the resource-allocation model might
eschew the claim of reduced availability. Such an account
would say that depressed people perform poorly on certain
cognitive tasks because they allocate fewer resources to them.
This is another way of saying that depressed people perform
poorly when they do not pay attention to the factors that
could benefit later recall (a potentially circular argument). In
this case, there is no advantage in reasoning about resources,
but perhaps a good advantage in asking why depressed people
do not spontaneously attend to task-relevant factors. This is
the question addressed next.

Difficulties in Inhibition
Hasher and Zacks's (1988) criticism of limited-resource
views on age-related performance in cognitive tasks led them
to propose a new perspective that can be extended to the
domain of depressive performance. Their model emphasized
disturbances in inhibitory processes associated with aging;
"off goal-path thoughts" and their prolonged maintenance
occupy attention. Similarly, Kuhl and Helle (1986) fouad
evidence that depressed subjects prolong attention to goals
that are not immediately relevant. Difficulties in inhibiting
irrelevant thoughts are proposed by several accounts of
depression, but most of them emphasize distractions associ
ated with self-focus and mood state (see reviews by Ingram,
1990, and Williams et al., 1988). Emphasizing a more general
difficulty in inhibition is perhaps a more parsimonious ap
proach to understanding depressive difficulties. The idea s
i
not that depressed people are thinking pervasively about
themselves and their feelings, any more than elderly people
perseverate about themselves and the aging process; rather,
disturbances in central inhibitory processes make any
thoughts that come to mind distracting.
Hasher and Zacks ( 1988) further suggested that aging peo
ple compensate for these disturbances by relying on environ
mental cues for performance. Our position on depressive
difficulties is similar. The lack ofinitiative shown by depressed
people perhaps results from competing thoughts that leave
them "in a muddle." But they can compensate for their
distractions by relying on environmental cues that focus their
attention on the task at hand and allow them to demonstrate
their competence. Ultimately, the resolution of issues related
to performance versus competence in depressive memory
might be less important than the discovery that depressed
people perform well when the environment guides their atten
tion.
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